Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Basic Concept: theories differ in what terms they choose as the basic concepts, which are not further defined. A definition of these concepts within the theory would be circular and may cause > paradoxes. E.g. The theory of mind by G. Ryle is based on the concept of disposition, other theories presuppose mental objects. See also paradoxes, theories, terms, definitions, definability, systems, explanations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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E. Tugendhat on Basic Concepts - Dictionary of Arguments
I 205 Basic Concepts/Tugendhat: if one refers to similarity as a psychological basis, this is only possible behavioristically - (without ideas). >Similarity, >Equality, >Behaviorism, >Imagination. I 519 Basic Concept/method/theory/Tugendhat: "right" is not explained and it is always presupposed. >Correctness. Other authors / (s): success as a basic concept >Success. Understanding/Tugendhat: understanding is ultimately unexplained. >Understanding._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |