Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself. C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Jon Barwise on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments

Peacocke I 137f
I/Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry: rule for use might be feasible: ""E "will always refer to the speaker". >Situation semantics
.
Peacocke: that determined fully the meaning, however: it requires more than just understanding of the language in which it happens - the speaker must always know that he himself, for example, is Smith, or fulfills any other description - therefore a rule is not sufficient.
I/Reference Rule/Peacocke: needs additional intension: manner of presentation of the first person. >First person.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Barw I
J. Barwise
Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976


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