Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Content: content is that part of a statement, which can be expressed by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content. See also Semantic content, Conceptual content, Mental content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Brandom on Content - Dictionary of Arguments
I 139ff Content/Brandom: any content is derived from the content of possible judgments. >Judgments. I 145 Semantic content: role in the determination of accuracies practice - basis: inferential relations - those who have content are subject to standards - Frege: Concepts from judgments. I 150f Content/Brandom: must not presume concepts and semantic content - there is a reaction without content: E.g. iron rusts in wet conditions - solution: inferential role - e.g. measurements: an instrument has no concepts. >Semantic content, >Conceptual content, >Inferential role. I 316 Circumstances/Content/Brandom: what the interpreter considers to be the circumstances is an essential feature of the empirical content. I 479 Content/Brandom: must specify the circumstances in the context under which a person is entitled to a definition - content by accuracy of inferences: three problems: 1) functional links do not only exist intra-linguistically, but also with the world - 2) Sentences often have significant portions expressing no parts which do not expres propositions - 3) Representational vocabulary is also used in analysis (> reference/Brandom). I 530 Content/Brandom: of an expression is determined by the set of SMSICs that regulate the substitution inferences (richness) - new vocabulary must be joined with the old vocabulary by SMSICs. >SMSICs. I 566 Content/Brandom (of sentences): the explicit expression of the relations between sentences, which are partly constitutive for sentences to be full of content, can be considered the content of sentences - the contents that are transmitted to the sentences through practices of community, are systematically intertwined with each other in a way that they can be considered to be products of those contents which are connected to the subsentential expressions. >Subsententials. I 658 Content/Brandom: assertions are expressed, therefore sentences are full of propositional content - subsentential expressions are indirectly full of inferential content thanks to their significance through substitution - unrepeatable Tokenings are embedded in substitutional inferences and thus indirectly inferentially contentful thanks to their connection to other Tokenings in a recurrent structure (inheritance). I 664 Content: there must be at least one context in which the addition of an assertion has nontrivial consequences. --- II 13 Content/Brandom: is explained by the act and not vice versa. >Actions. II 35 Content/Brandom: non-inferential circumstances: (perception circumstances) are a crucial element of the content of a concept such as red - further content approves the inference from the circumstances to the consequences of using it appropriately, regardless of whether those circumstances are themselves specified in narrowly defined inferential concepts. --- I 698 Content/Action/Brandom: states and actions, as premises and conclusions, obtain content by being embedded in consequences and inferences (instead of representation). I 662 Definition content/equality/Frege : "Two judgements have the same content if and only if the conclusions that can be drawn from one in connection with various others, always also follow from the other in connection with the same other judgements". BrandomVsFrege: this is a universal quantification via auxiliary hypotheses - such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a quantity could always be found: according to Frege, any two judgements have the same consequences if they are connected with a contradiction. >Implication paradox. I 731 Narrow/Content/BrandomVs: (depends only on the individual): coherent history barely possible which only considers one individual - furthermore, the stories of similar individuals should be the same - but different context always possible. >wide/narrow content._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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