Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Logic: logic is the doctrine of the admissibility or inadmissibility of relations between statements and thus the validity of the compositions of these statements. In particular, the question is whether conclusions can be obtained from certain presuppositions such as premises or antecedents. Logical formulas are not interpreted at first. Only the interpretation, i. e. the insertion of values, e.g. objects instead of the free variables, makes the question of their truth meaningful._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Logic Texts on Logic - Dictionary of Arguments
Hoyningen-Huene II 148f Relation of logic to reality: A: No one can read this book in three days. B: A hard-working student can read this book in three days. Whether there are hard-working students is something that cannot be captured with the statement logic. The inconsistency of the example can only be detected with the predicate logic. Other inconsistencies cannot be captured by the means of logic at all: A: Hans is a giant. - B: Hans is a dwarf. --- Read III 62f Difference compact/non-compact: classical logic is a logic of the 1st level. A categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a second-level logic. (Quantifiers also for properties). >Second order logic. Logic first order/second order are not to be distinguished syntactically, but semantically! E.g. Napoleon has all properties of an emperor: are not syntactically to be distinguished, whether logic 1st or 2nd level. III 70ff VsClassical Logic: This reduction, of course, fails. For "nothing is round and square" is necessarily true, but its non-logical components cannot be interpreted in any way that makes this statement false. Allowing variable areas of definition for classical representation was a catastrophe. The modality has returned. We can make a substitution, but we cannot really change the range. >Range, >Modality. If an object is round, it follows that it is not square. But this conclusion is not valid thanks to the form, but thanks to the content. III 79 It was a mistake to express the truth-preservation criterion as "it is impossible that the premisses are true and the conclusion false". Because it is not so obvious that there is a need to conclude from A to B. Provided he is cowardly, it follows that he is either cowardly or - what one wants. But simply from the fact that he is cowardly does not follow that if he is not cowardly - what one wants. >EFQ/ex falso quodlibet. III 151 Logic 1st order: individuals, 2nd order: variables for predicates, distribution of the predicates by quantifiers. 1st level allows restricted vocabulary of the 2nd level: existence and universal quantifier! >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Existence predicate, >Existence. III 161 Free logic: no existence assumptions - no conclusion from the absence of the truth value to falsehood - global evaluation. >Truth value, >Truth value gaps, >Truth value agglomeration, >Valuation. --- Menne I 26 Justification of Logic/Menne: the so-called logical principles of identity, of consistency, and the excluded middle are not sufficient to derive the logic. In addition, ten theorems and rules of the propositional logic are needed, just to derive the syllogistic exactly. These axioms do not represent obvious ontological principles. Kant: transcendental justification of logic. It must be valid a priori. >Logic/Kant. Menne I 28 The justification from the language: oversees that there is no explicit logic at all if the language itself already contained logic. Precisely because language does not always proceed logically, the logic is needed for the standardization of language. Menne: there must be a recursive procedure for justification. >Justification, >Recursion._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 |