Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Saul A. Kripke on Meaning (Intending) - Dictionary of Arguments
Nagel I 63 ff Meaning/Kripke/Nagel: problem: there is a gap between the normative and non-normative. Meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers. Behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences. Therefore, these cannot consist in those. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke, >Semantic facts, >Norm, >Experience. --- McGinn I 117 ff McGinn: irreducibility theory: Kripke: intended sense should be an undefined fundamental part of the world while the semantic expressions in analytical terms are considered to be as fundamental as the basic concepts of geometry. Words and concepts are in a representational relationship to the world but it is impossible that an explanation would indicate what the relationship is and on what it depends on. It is a simple fact that we mean things as we do because we digest and kick them. --- II 210 Meaning/Russell/KripkeVsDonnellan: it is about the fact that something is the only thing that fulfils the designation "the φ-er "ψ-s: ""φ(x) ∧ (y)(φ(y) > y = x)". --- Stegmüller IV 50 Kripke’s Wittgenstein: not a fact: even an "omniscient" being could not know what we mean - there is no fact of meaning -> Non-factualism. Important argument: the skeptical problem is not epistemic, it is ontologic. Vs "best explanation": it would also falsely recognize the problem as epistemic. >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule following, >Private language._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Meaning (Intending)
