Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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John McDowell on Meaning (Intending) - Dictionary of Arguments
I 52 Meaning/Wittgenstein: when we say or mean that something is so and so, then we do not stop with what we think, somewhere before the fact. But we believe that it is so and so. >Intending/Wittgenstein, >Fact, >State of affairs. McDowell: This can (un-wittgensteinian) be expressed as follows: there is no ontological gulf between what one can think, and what may be the case. >World/Thinking, >Ontology. In the mere idea of thought no distance is implied. >Thought._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, |