Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Platonism: Platonism in the narrower sense is the thesis in modern philosophy that some ideas and mental objects, especially ideas, are attributed reality. Various authors are Platonists with respect to e.g. numbers, mathematical entities, or universals. In contrast, e.g. intuitionism of mathematics assumes that numbers are not objects. This distinction has a significant effect on the logical formalisability of statements of mathematics. See also nominalism, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, completeness, evidence, fictions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
W.V.O. Quine on Platonism - Dictionary of Arguments
XII 44 Platonic Idea/Quine: is not the same as a mental idea. >Ideas/Quine. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: is more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about choosing a language. >Language/Quine. VII(f) 125 Conceptualism VsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries. Problem: Poincaré's impredicative definition: Def Impredicative Definition/Poincaré/Quine: the specification of a class by a realm of objects within which this class is located. >Classes/Quine. VII (f) 126 Classes/Platonism/Quine: when classes are considered pre-existing, there is no objection to picking one of them by a move that presupposes their existence. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, however, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Of course, this should not be interpreted in terms of time. VII (f) 127 Platonism/Conceptualism/Quine: both allow universals and classes as irreducible. Conceptualism: allows fewer classes. But rests on a rather metaphorical reason: "Origin". >Conceptualism/Quine. V 126 Platonism/Quine: is opened by form words, not by color words! Reason: a union of color spots has the same color, but a union of spots of a certain shape does not necessarily have the same shape._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
||
