Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Brian Loar on Propositional Attitudes - Dictionary of Arguments
Avramides I 35 Propositional attitude/Loar/Avramides: when placed on the right side of biconditionals, one no longer has to do with meaning, but with the content of propositional attitudes. Avramides: caution: two types of semantics: Def wide semantics: covers meaning, truth, reference, etc. Def narrow semantics: quasi-equivalent to "meaning". Propositional attitudes/Avramides: further distinction: a) public language b) language of mind (Mentalese). >Language of thought. Reductionism: can analyze propositional attitude only non-semantically. LoarVspropositions about belief. Avramides I 78 Meaning/Grice/reduction/psychology/semantics/Avramides: Question: must the analysis use psychological terms which are not based on the semantic concepts first analyzed? >Meaning theory. Loar: yes, you can analyze propositional attitudes without semantic concepts of public language.(1) >Meaning theory/Loar. 1. Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Loar
> Counter arguments in relation to Propositional Attitudes
