Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Psychology: Psychology is the scientific study of mind and behavior. It encompasses human development, cognition, emotion, personality, social behavior, and mental disorders. See also Stages of Development, Social Behavior, Behavior, Personality, Personality traits, Emotion, Cognition.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Psychology - Dictionary of Arguments

V 58
Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine
) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation.
>Observation Sentences/Quine
XII 91
Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology?
TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular.
No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection.
>Science/Quine
XII 92
Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction:
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end.
XII 98
Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject.
Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation.
XII 99
Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction.
>Rational Reconstruction/Quine
New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology.
>Epistemology/Quine:
Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data.
New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology.
>Epistemology/Quine
XI 100
Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism.
QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input.
Priority is what is causally closer.
QuineVsAntipsychologism.
I 44
Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case.
I 154
Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts.
A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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