Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Space, philosophy: various discussions deal, among others, with the question whether the space is absolute or whether empty space is possible. In different sciences, multi-dimensional spaces with certain properties are used to better calculate like Hilbert spaces in the theory of relativity or multidimensional spaces in mathematical nodal theory. No ontological assumptions are made. See also substantivalism, relativism, movement, absoluteness, compactness, conceptual space, dimensions, logical space, four-dimensionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Colin McGinn on Space - Dictionary of Arguments
I125 Mind/brain/space/McGinn: while the brain is three-dimensional, the mind cannot be defined spatially in this way. How can this mind then be identical to the brain? >Brain, >Mind, >Consiousness. II 126 Representation/sensation/McGinn: the spatiality of the world is something that our impressions never lack. II 127 Mirrors are for the sense of sight, but not for the sense of touch! Also not for hearing, smelling and tasting. But these are also space-dependent, though not as strong as seeing. II 139 Our consciousness is not spatially. Consciousness itself is not physically perceptible. It enables us to perceive the world, but it itself is not so noticeable. The mind is not spatially, so the senses cannot respond to it in principle. Space/consciousness/materialism: denies that consciousness is not spatial. Mind/brain/McGinn: Thesis: the key is that the brain itself is not the simple spatial condition, for which we take it. II 140 Originally pre-spatial properties (before the Big Bang) would therefore (assuming physical conservation) be cause of matter and mind. II 141 Consciousness/Big Bang/McGinn: Thesis: consciousness is sort of a fossil of the early universe. (Before the Big Bang.) It must entail reminiscences of this far past time. II 144 Space/McGinn: It is an even more radical approach than the above conceivable: namely, that we are completely wrong with our idea of what is actually space. "Space" is for us only a label for something out there, it does not carry a substantive statement about the properties of the medium named by it. The mind does not have length and width. We only perceive the room through the senses, but that says nothing about how it really is. >Space. II 145 Thesis: perhaps the space has a (hidden) structure, which puts it in a position to unite mind and matter in itself. II 146 This space gives the mind a home, because it needs one. Somewhere. II 148/49 Mind, unlike numbers, is causally correlated with matter in space, so it cannot be entirely located outside the space. Now, if space is something that contains all causally linked things, then the conscious mind must be present in any sense in the space._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
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