Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome![]() | |||
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Schematic letters, logic: the schematic letters F, G, H ... stand in logical formulas for properties, in contrast to the variables x, y, z ..., which represent objects to which properties are attributed. E.g. (Ex) (Fx) "There is an F". Properties cannot be quantified over in first order logic. That is, it is impossible to express what number of properties belong to an object. See also quantification, quantifiability, second order logic, “Everything he said is true”, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Schematic Letters - Dictionary of Arguments
II 201f Problem: do not reify properties and classes. Solution: distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables. --- IX 7ff~ Predicate letters: F, G, etc. do not introduce anything explicit. --- IX 7ff~ Statement schemes: the predicate letters F, G ... should never be considered as variables that take attributes or classes as values - they are kept away from quantifiers and do not appear in statements at all. --- X 32 Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is not even variable over objects, and once schematic letter for sentences, but only variable - (no semantic ascent necessary). --- X 47 Schematic letters/Quine: placeholders for sentences of the object language. They do not belong to the object language itself. --- X 77 Model/Quine: of a scheme: is a quantity n-tuple: each schematic letter (for predicates) corresponds to a set, at the beginning of the n-tuple is a non-empty set U, the universal set or value range of the variables x, x, etc. the remaining sets of the model are the values of the set variables a, b, etc. Satisfaction: a model fulfills a scheme, if its set-theoretic analogue (sentence) is true._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |