Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Pain, philosophy of mind: the philosophical discussion deals with the peculiarities of the concept of pain in contrast to other concepts such as perceptions, sensations and stimuli. In particular, it is about the relationship between physical and mental realization of pain. See also mind body problem, physical/psychic, rigidity, possible worlds, possible world semantics, perception, introspection, private language, necessity, certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Pain - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 129 Martians’ pain/LewisVsQuine/Vsnaturalised epistemology - physicalist vocabulary needs not to be true. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 --- Lewis I 39f Pain/Lewis: a theory of mind should not exclude the possibility of shifted pain (same conditions, contrasting effect) and Martian pain: other states, same impact) - but there should be a simple sense of pain, where we can have all the pain - Shifted pain/Martians’ pain: show that causal role, pain and physical realization are only linked contingently. --- I (c) 41 Problem: how can we characterize pain a priori by causal role, despite the acknowledgment of this fact? - Identity theory solves the problem for Shifted Pain, but fails on Martians’ Pain. - Behaviorism: here the situation is reversed. I (c) 42 Pain/Lewis: if a particular neural state preferably causes pain, then this state is pain - but the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state. - The concept of ...- is an intentional functor. - The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different - Pain would have been something else. - It could have been that the owner of the role does not own it and some non-owner owns it. - Lewis/Armstrong: pain is non-rigid - yet no coincidence of two states (pain plus neuronal state) but one single state. - - - I (b) 33 ff Pains are so defined by what the majority usually ... --- I (c) 40 Shifted pain: same states - different impacts. From this we learn that pain is merely linked contingently with its causal role. I (c) 42 Martians’ pain: other states (than ours) - Same effect. From this we learn that pain is linked merely contingently with its physical realization. But the concept of pain is not the concept of this neural state! (> concepts,> identity). I (c) 42 The concept of .. is an intentional functor. The two concepts could have applied to something different if the causal role was different. Lewis/Armstrong: The concept of pain is a non-rigid designator! I (c) 52 Identity pain/neural state: contingent! LL. But I do not say that we have two states. If the person feels pain, it is pain, no matter what kind of causal role or physical condition the state has. Otherwise it is not pain. --- Schwarz I 146 Pain/Lewis/Schwarz: state with such and such causal role- ((s) then biochemical state (type) with the same causal role: Therefore, identification through precisely this role - (s) Vs (s): then circular:> theory of reference._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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