Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Self-consciousness, philosophy: self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that allows a localization of the thinking subject in the logical space. The prerequisite for self-consciousness is consciousness of external and internal processes as well as the ability to differentiate between these two sources of influences. See also identification, self-identification, self, I, consciousness, individuation, identity, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Peter F. Strawson on Self- Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 41ff Self-consciousness/Strawson: M-predicates: do not presuppose consciousness to which they are attributed P-predicates: (psychological): imply that the person to whom they are attributed, knows this. Def P*-predicates/Shoemaker: it is impossible that any other subject, except me, can have certain properties. >Terminology/Strawson. Sydney Shoemaker (I968): Self-Reference and Self-Awareness, in: Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 555-578 --- Strawson I 130 I/self-consciousness/Strawson: previously only: all my experiences are specifically related to the body M, this one is distinguished by that. - But the same goes for all other bodies in each case. Problem: what does the word "mine" has to do in it? >Identification, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Identification/Strawson, >Particulars/Strawson. I 131 Uniqueness of the body is no guarantee of Cartesian soul. Solution: we must recognize the concept of the person as a primitive (but not fundamental) concept. >Body._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |