Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

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Under-determination, philosophy: contrary to e.g. geometric figures, no everyday object is fully described. An object is under-determined, if not all features belonging to its concept can be assigned with a value. The under-determinateness of theories is the problem that, even if an object is fully described in the framework of a theory, various other, non-equivalent theories can still apply to it. See also determinateness, uncertainty of translation, Gavagai, definition, criteria, certainty, quantum mechanics.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Underdetermination - Dictionary of Arguments

X 25ff
Underdetermination/Empiricism/Quine: also through unmonitored data.
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Lauener XI 119
Underdetermination/Identity of theories/Quine/Lauener: theories: can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent. - E.g. interchanging -electron/molecule-: makes true sentences false.
Since the change is purely terminological, you can say that both versions express the same theory. - So they are empirically equivalent - however, the predicates can be reconstructed in a way that the theories also become logically equivalent.
E.g. empirically equivalent:
Theory a) space infinite
Theory b) finite, objects shrink with distance from the center.
Again, the predicates can be rephrased in such a way that the theories are logically equivalent. Underdetermination: In order to prove them, it would have to have an influence on the empirical content.
Quine: it is almost impossible to find an example.
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Lauener XI 120
Underdetermination/Quine/Lauener: there are rivals to every infinite theory that are equivalent empirically, but not logically, and that cannot be made logically equivalent by reconstructing the predicates.
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Stroud I 217
Underdetermination/Theory/Theoretical terms/Entities/Quine/Stroud: the truths that the scientist introduces e.g. about molecules are not sufficiently determined by all the truths that he knows or can ever know about the normal objects. - (s) There could be several possible theories which imply the same set of truths about the normal objects, but differ in terms of the theoretical ones. - theoretical entities do not follow from the truths about normal things.
Quine/Stroud: for him, normal objects are also just hypotheses. - This is how all theories go beyond data. - Underdetermination: also remains, if we included all past and future nervous stimuli of all people.
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I 234
Problem: even true sentences go beyond the data, are projections - therefore they cannot be known.
>Theories
; cf. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


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