Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Generalization: a generalization is the extension of a statement (an attribution of properties) that applies to a domain D of objects to an object domain E that is larger than D and contains D. Time points may also belong to the subject domain. A property which fully applies to the objects of an object domain may be partially applicable to the objects of a larger domain. See also validity, general invalidity, general, predication, methods._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Generalization - Dictionary of Arguments
I 152 Individual Sciences/reductionism/natural kind/generalization/Fodor: idividual sciences must allow exceptions. The laws which connect the individual disjuncts in liberal reductionism, however, do not need to allow any exceptions. Wrong solution: natural ways of individual sciences to distinguish wherever the natural kinds equal physics. This requirement would make the laws of the individual sciences valid without exception. E.g. its own economic law for each currency system would invariably be valid, but no longer a generalization, gain in insight. Then you can no longer tell what is happening in monetary systems, then e.g. a currency system would no longer be a natural kind. Exceptions are superficially explained on the level of reducing science. >Reduction, >Reductionism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |