Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Verification, philosophy: verification means determining the truth value ("true" or "false") of statements that refer to the observable. The admissible means of verification are determined by the theories, the statements belong to. See also verificationism, confirmation, certainty, empiricism, foundation, proof, manifestation, understanding, generalization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Carl Hempel on Verification - Dictionary of Arguments
I 99 Verification/Natural Laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements. Therefore, there is never a final verification. Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. --- Bubner I 125 Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: The relationship of logical inclusion of sentences avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences. Formal rules of derivation: Rehabilitation of deduction. With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: the deductive nomological explanation is a scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, i.e. the subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under explanation reasons (explanas). The explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr) I 127 Deduction schema/Hempel: C1, C2,... Ck L1, L2,... Lr E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: we need law-like statements instead of laws. Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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