Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Vocabulary: A language’s vocabulary comprises all the words currently used by its speakers. The vocabulary is written down in dictionaries in comparison to grammar and syntax rules laid down in “rule books”. Vocabulary can be reduced to its use at a particular time or by individual speakers for the purpose of research. See also idiolect, language, private language, conservatism, words, meaning of a word, meaning. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Vocabulary - Dictionary of Arguments
III 161 Def conceptual relativism/term relativity/Searle: representation systems such as vocabularies are human creations and thus arbitrary. Some philosophers believe that this is a problem for realism. >Conceptual relativism. --- I 15 Vocabulary/Searle: in the conflict of dualism and monism both sides are caught in a serious error. The vocabulary and assumptions of both are wrong. >Dualism, >Monism, >Property dualism. I 20 Spirit/intentionality/materialism//Dennett/Searle: the thesis of materialism: our vocabulary of the spiritual does not actually stand for something intrinsically spiritual. Dennett: it is merely a vocabulary suitable for predicting and explaining behaviour. >Materialism. I 43 Smart (1959)(1) had tried to find a "topic-neutral" vocabulary and to avoid the so-called nomological appendages. I 443/44 SearleVsSmart: SearleVs"topic neutral": note that nobody has the impression that digestion must be described in a "topic neutral" vocabulary. I 189 Example pain/unconscious: could there be "unconscious pain"? Searle: this is not a dispute with a factual content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact. >Pain, >Fact. 1. J.J.Smart Sensations and Brain Processes. In: Philosophical Review. Band 68, 1959_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Vocabulary
