Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Truth makers, philosophy: Some theories assume that, in the case of true statements, there must be something that is the reason why they are true, the so-called truth makers. Opponents of the truth maker theories represent the view that these truth makers are ultimately a repetition of the description of a state of affairs in other words, whereby a description cannot be made true by another description. One problem is the specification of truth makers when it comes to statements about non-existence. See also reason, justification, truth, facts, universals, natural laws, negation, causality, causal theory, causal explanation, ontology, non-existence, non-factualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
David M. Armstrong on Truthmakers - Dictionary of Arguments
Place I 21 Truth Maker/Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" is therefore no truth maker. - There are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below: but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions). >Counterfactual conditionals. - - - Place II 66 Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Place: the truthmaker is a special disposition, finite. (Like Goodman, nominalist). ArmstrongVsPlace:the truthmaker is a law, infinite. - - - II (c) 92 Truth Maker/Armstrong: truthmakers are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-dispositional properties plus laws of nature are sufficient. - E.g., two non-occurring, equally likely events: here there is no fact as truthmaker. Same case: E.g.s distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: no truth maker, no certain way. Nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have behaved idiosyncratic. II (c) 99 Laws/Armstrong: Laws are truth makers for law statements. - Atomic state: higher order relation between universals; the number of instantiation is irrelevant. All are identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G. Hume: molecular state: regularity. Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved. - - - Place III 121 Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary. - - - Place IV 156 Truth Maker/Place: it is tempting to assume that the state which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal law statement true from which it is epistemically derived. - (Vs"counterfactual facts"). PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176 - - - Martin III 175f Truth maker/MartinVsArmstrong: it is still unclear whether his invocation of laws is strong enough to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water. Martin III 176 Whatever laws he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation. II 182 f Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: absence actually is a suitable truth maker: a state. Problem: a state is merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term). David Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise it is trivial. Solution/Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate. MartinVsLewis: "The way the universe is" is a general term, but still 1st order! Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation. Existence theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
||
> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Truthmakers
