Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Contradictions, philosophy: A. Contradiction in a broad sense is conceived in philosophy, for example, in Hegel or Marx, as a fruitful contrast, which gives rise to a further development. B. In bivalent logic, a contradictory statement is a statement of the form A and non-A. Statements of this form cannot be true. See also consistency, theorem of contradiction, multi-valued logic._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Contradictions - Dictionary of Arguments
II 100 Contradiction/Stalnaker: it is essential that logical falsehoods are absolutely impossible. - This is the condition that they can not be believed. >Logical truth, >Logical necessity, >Beliefs. Problem/FieldVsStalnaker: Then Cantor could not have established his (later proven to be contradictory) set theory. II 102 Cantor had not "split" belief states that had to be linked. - Rather, they all together explained his actions. >Explanation, >Behavior, >Belief states._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |