|Recognition, philosophy: the ability of a conscious subject to identify a pattern that has already been received by this subject. This ability is no knowledge-how and no quale, since there is no particular way of experience that all the cases of recognition have in common. However, the ability to recognize certain features can be learned, but this is actually an identification and no recognition. See also memory, qualia, knowledge-how, knowledge, computation, identification, individuation, similarity, equality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Daniel Dennett on Recognition - Dictionary of Arguments
Thesis: there must be at least two systems that can recognize a face.
E.g. A dog sees Odysseus sober on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, and drunk on the other days.
It can draw several conclusions: 1) That there are drunken and sober people
2) That a man can be drunk on one day, and sober on the other,
3) that Odysseus is such a person .
The conclusions 2 and 3 are not possible to learn logically from the course of events alone. In addition, it needs a (error-prone , but -perceived by him as reliable) source of identification ( Millikan).
Accordingly, a mirror cannot tell me what I look like, as long as I don t have another method to identify the face to be seen there as my own._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005