Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Communication: In general, communication is the transmission of information between several entities (people, animals, cells) that are able to process this information. In communication, information is copied and not merely transmitted, since it is not lost at the original location. New information emerges where applicable in the individuals involved in the communication. The aim of communication is to change the information of a recipient. Human communication also includes the manner of transmission, e.g. ironic coloring of a quotation or the knowledge about the credibility of a source. See also information, language, communication theory, actions, understanding, frame theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stanley Cavell on Communication - Dictionary of Arguments
II 181 Communication/Language/Cavell: not everything could be said explicitly otherwise communication could only be acoustically destroyed. We are therefore responsible for the implications as well as for the explicitly stated. >Respnsibility, >Language, >Speaking, >Information, >Implication, cf. >Logical Omniscience. The fact that the implications of an utterance are appropriate can no longer be ensured by a general procedure, as can be determined by whether all that is said is true. ("Everything he said")._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Communication
