Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Fred Dretske on Reference - Dictionary of Arguments
Brandom I 600 Reference/Triangulation: The crossing point of two chains can help understand reference: e.g., the views of teacher and learning person. >Triangulation. Also Dretske: e.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the temperature of the room, to the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or to the closing of the contact. (> Measuring). The practical consequences do not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and, if necessary, turns the heater on and off, the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream with the change of the room temperature and downstream with the reaction to turn the heater on or off. --- I 951 Since the two chains intersect at two points, one must imagine them curved. BrandomVsDretske: does that really solve the problem? Is there not still the reaction to the closest disjunctive stimulus? Closing the bimetal strip or the mercury contact? --- I 601 Concept: Mere differing ability to react (cf. > RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions, Brandom) is not enough to recognize the use of terms! Rationalistic supplementation: the inferential role of the reaction is crucial._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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