Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Learning: learning is acquiring the ability to establish relationships between signs, symptoms or symbols and objects. This also includes e.g. recognition and recollection of patterns, similarities, sensory perceptions, self-perception, etc. In the ideal case, the ability to apply generalizations to future cases is acquired while learning. See also knowledge, knowledge-how, competence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Frank Jackson on Learning - Dictionary of Arguments
Schwarz I 157 Phenomenon/phenomenal properties/knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: in addition to the fact that there can be independent phenomenal facts next to the physical facts, and besides the zombie intuition this speaks in favour of being able to learn such facts! E.g. Jackson: Mary learns phenomenal facts about colours. >Colours, >Colour words, >Knowing how, >Phenomena. Schwarz I 158 Colour explorer Mary/Jackson/Knowledge-how/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. when she is released, she learns something new: "How it is" to have a red experience. LewisVs: for him, the gain in knowledge is a problem only if it can really rule out open possibilities with regard to the world. According to Lewis, such possibilities must not exist: the physical facts leave no alternatives open in reference to the world. No problem is Mary's new information about her own situation in the world. (Lewis pro: 1988e(1), 268ff, 287) Schwarz: only now she can ask if other people also have this (kind of) experience. Fact/Mary: It is also unproblematic that she now now internally represents facts that were previously known to her when she acquires new "terms" that were not previously available to her. (Lewis pro: she acquires new forms of representation (1983d(2), 131f) Mary-Example/Lewis: but this is not an interesting advance in knowledge! Mary-Example/McMullen, (1985)(3)/Perry (2001)(4): this is essentially indexical and/or demonstrative information. >Qualia. 1. David Lewis [1988e]: “What Experience Teaches”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57. 2. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 3. Carolyn McMullen [1985]: “‘Knowing what it’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical”. Philosophical Studies, 48: 211–233 4. John Perry [2001]: Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousnes. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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