Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Senseless/meaningless: Meaningless in philosophy and logic are statements which cannot be negated. False assertions on the other hand are never senseless. Otherwise, their truth value could not be established. See also Sense, Truth, Negation, Meaning, Sentence meaning, Truth value, Misinformation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Marvin Minsky on Sensible/senseless - Dictionary of Arguments
Münch III 98 Sense/senseless/meaningless/language/Chomsky/Minsky: E.g. (A) colorless green ideas sleep furiously Is treated quite differently than (B) furiously sleep ideas green colorless. Thesis: What is involved in the recognition of sentences must be different from what is involved in the understanding of meaning. >Syntax, >Information processing, >Language, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. Marvin Minsky, “A framework for representing knowledge” in: John Haugeland (Ed) Mind, design, Montgomery 1981, pp. 95-128_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |