|Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
David Papineau on Representation - Dictionary of Arguments
Representation/Animals/Papineau: there is the danger to put more into the explanation than justified by the specific design of animals.
Representation/Papineau: why should an animal have no general representations?
After all, it has this disposition right now, because its behavior in the past has led to this result.
Disposition/Representation/Papineau: should the disposition itself not be regarded as the incarnation of the general information "Drinking supplies water"?
I do not want to dispute such content attributions. The disposition represents information about the general "connection of reaction with result" (B & T, V > R).
Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: when it requires explicit representations, it no longer follows that simple beings can be regarded as purpose-means thinkers.
Explicit representation requires physical tangibility.
Vs: all behavioral dispositions must have some kind of physical embodiment.
Explicit/implicit: if an organism implicitly has different pieces of general information in different dispositions ("water is in ponds"), it still has no system to combine them.
Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information.
Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings.
Vs: 1. Purpose-middle-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom.
2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component...
...of our evolutionary heritage.
Then purpose-means-thinking is a by-product.
Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
"The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004