Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth Predicate: the truth predicate of a language is the "is true" expressed in this language. Its allowance can be empirically justified or attributed to the statement on the basis of the logical form. According to the redundancy theory, the truth-predicate is fundamentally superfluous. According to W.V.O. Quine (Quine, Philosophie der Logik, 2005, p. 33), the truth predicate is merely used for generalization. For example, all sentences of a particular form are true. A language containing its own truth-predicate is semantically closed. In such a language, semantic paradoxes are possible. See also expressiveness, circularity, semantic closeness, truth, truth definition, redundancy theory, self-reference, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Scott Soames on Truth Predicate - Dictionary of Arguments
I 479 Truth predicate/T-predicate/Tarski/Soames: the T-predicate is purely quantitative theory. - There are no conditions for the meanings. E.g. ["Snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessary equivalent in elemental modal logic. >Equivalence, >Tarski scheme, >Quote/Disquotation. I 480 T-predicate/Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true sentences. >Discoveries, >Empiricism, >Truth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Predicate
