Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Certainty: In philosophy this is about whether we can know that we know something. The term was coined by L. Wittgenstein in the discussion of G. E. Moore. See also Moore's Hands, Skepticism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G.W. Leibniz on Certainty - Dictionary of Arguments
Holz I 50 Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. I 53 Certainty/proof/perception/experience/Leibniz: of the multiplicity expressed in an infinite set of sentences, one can say that these sentences are perceived by us as the basis of every knowledge of truth. Before any provability! This process of perception is just with what I experience myself. (> I, Ego, Self, Experience/Leibniz, "I think"). This is also where the I differs from every other. (Position in the chain, position in the universe). Therefore the sentence "varia a me percipiuntur" is not provable and also not obliged to be proved. It is not possible here to go back to an underlying principle. The two principles (of identity and variety) are only necessary to form further sentences._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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