Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Consciousness, philosophy: consciousness ist the experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also Intentionality, Identity theory, Other minds, Self-consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Patricia Churchland on Consciousness - Dictionary of Arguments
Güzeldere I 397f Consciousness of mental states: "perceptual-like": Locke, Armstrong, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Lycan "Thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, also Descartes. Güzeldere I 404 Awareness/Locke/Churchland/Armstrong/Lycan: speaking of "scanning" or "monitoring". Question: What is perceived, the content, or the state itself? Güzeldere I 411 Consciousness/Churchland: introspective awareness is a subspecies of perception. Thesis: In the language of a mature neuroscience, there might be a more differentiated representation of "human subjective consciousness". E.g. Dopamine level could be interpreted as Gm7 chords in music. We need to learn this conceptual system and practice its application. (Davidson's conceptual scheme). Güzeldere: Churchland is thus not only convinced that mental states are identical with brain states, but also that their properties are identical. --- Churchland II 475 Consciousness/Dennett: is a virtual machine. Thesis: People become aware of the extent to which they acquire language and learn to talk about themselves. In this transition, a parallel machine (the neural networks in the brain) simulates a serial machine (which performs the operations step by step on the basis of rules that can be recursive). Dennett: Consciousness behaves like the flight simulator to the processes within the computer. II 476 ChurchlandVsDennett: 1. The assumption of the language dependence of consciousness denies children and animals consciousness. II 477 2. It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing. 3. No virtual machine is required, a particular class of operations can be the output of a single, if heavily distributed, network. Dennett could be quite right, but not on this way._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Güzeldere I Güven Güzeldere "Is consciousness the perception of what passes in the mind?" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Churchland
> Counter arguments in relation to Consciousness
