Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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John Rawls on Comparability - Dictionary of Arguments
I 174 Comparability/comparison/society/justice/Rawls: the clearest basis for interpersonal comparisons is in terms of primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, health care, access opportunities), i. e. things that any rational person will probably want, no matter what else he/she wants. However, the more we move on to more specific provisions, the more difficult it becomes. This is because the assessment of foreign preferences would increasingly require us to change our own nature. Purposes/intentions: it seems to be in vain to define his measure for interpersonal comparisons, taking into account all possible intentions and objectives. The value of the circumstances of others is not for us - as the construction (of the average utility) would make us expect - the value of the circumstances for the other person itself. --- I 175 Solution/Utilitarianism/Rawls: utilitarianism could create directories of public goods and thus define its principle. However, this would require major changes to the theory of justice. Rawl's solution: the veil of ignorance (in the initial situation of a society to be built, members should not know which position they will take later) prevents a knowledge about the circumstances of others anyway._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Rawls
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-03-24