Majority/minority/elections/politics/rights/justice/Rawls: it is sometimes objected to the majority rule that it does not take into account the strength of the needs and feelings of the minority.
RawlsVs: it is a misunderstanding that the strength of feelings played a role in legislation. On the contrary: whenever laws and justice play a role, we must not judge according to feelings, but rather in such a way that justice is strengthened. It is about how fair the probable outcome will be.
Similarly, if there is approximately equality between the parties involved:
Everything depends on the fairness of the probable outcome.
Problem: when the notions of justice in society diverge, it becomes more difficult to defend a pure majority rule. If suspicion and resentment prevail in a society, there may be no reliable procedures for making decisions.
The crux of the matter here is that strength of emotions is not a yardstick for judging the legality of constitutional order.
Majorities/Rawls: it is not written anywhere that the will of the majority is synonymous with law. If the majority can also write the Constitution, this does not guarantee that all elements are fair.
If we criticise laws, we do so by showing that they would not have been elected under ideal conditions.
Legislation/Rawls: is designed according to different principles than an ideal market; the ideal market requires different conditions of functioning and other principles. (See Markets/Rawls, Efficiency/Rawls). The goal of markets is efficiency, that of legislation is justice. While it is important to assume that ideal markets are efficient, legislation does not require all results to be fair._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005