Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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George Herbert Mead on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Habermas IV 66 I/Self/Mead/Habermas: the transition from symbolically mediated to normatively regulated interaction not only enables a change to modally differentiated communication. It does not only mean the formation of a social world, but also the symbolic structuring of motives for action. From the perspective of socialization, this side of the socialization process presents itself as the formation of an identity. Mead: treats identity formation as a relationship between the "Me" and the "I". Me: the perspective from which the child, taking the expectations of the generalized other in the opposite, builds up a system of inner behavioral controls. Thus, on the path of internalizing social roles, a super-ego structure is formed. I/Mead: we react to this as I. (1) Habermas IV 67 I/Mead: Mead understands the "I" as the generalized ability to find creative solutions for situations where something like the self-realization of the person is at stake.(2) Habermas: according to this, the "I" is both the motor and governor of an individualization that can only be achieved through socialization. >Socialization. Habermas IV 94 I/Mead/Habermas: "The separation of "I" and "Me" is not fiction, they are not identical, since the I is never completely calculable. The "Me" calls for an "I" when we fulfil obligations...but the I is always a little different from what the situation itself demands (...) Together they form a personality as it appears in the social experience (...) The self is essentially a social process consisting of these two different phases. Without these two phases there would be no conscious responsibility and also no new experiences". (3) >Self. 1.G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 217 2.Ibid p. 248 3. Ibid. p. 221_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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> Counter arguments against Mead
> Counter arguments in relation to I, Ego, Self
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-25