Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| State: In political philosophy, the state (polity) is a centralized political organization with authority over a defined territory and population. It enforces laws, maintains order, and exercises governance through various institutions. See also Society, Nations, Governance, Institutions, Power, Law, Laws, Rights, Jurisdiction, Legislation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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James M. Buchanan on State (Polity) - Dictionary of Arguments
Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. (1) Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan, >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.(2) 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 - - - Boudreaux I 21 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: „The state has its origin in, and depends for its continuance upon, the desires of individuals to fulfil a certain portion of their wants collectively. The state has no ends other than those of its individual members and is not a separate decision-making unit. State decisions are, in the final analysis, the collective decisions of individuals.“(1) Government Debt/Boudreaux/Holcombe: When analyzing the activities of government, the costs and benefits of government policies fall on individuals, not on aggregates or groups. The argument that domestically held public debt is no burden because “we owe it to ourselves” is revealed as fallacious once we recognize that the aggregate—ourselves—is really composed of many individuals, some of whom will pay the taxes to finance the debt repayment, and some of whom will receive the proceeds when they redeem the bonds they hold. Boudreaux I 74 State/Buchanan/Boudreaux/Holcombe: Ideally, the outputs of the productive state result from collective agreement in which individuals exchange their tax payments for the collectively produced outputs - outputs such as pollution abatement, roads, and municipal parks. Problem: But how can citizens determine the size and range of duties of the productive state that will be most welfare-enhancing? How can they ensure that the state does what the people wish it to do and only what they wish it to do? (…) Buchanan’s answer was to limit the activities of the state to those that command agreement from all of its constituents. But this benchmark of consensus on state activities presents a challenge. >Agreement/Buchanan, >Democracy/Buchanan, >Government/Buchanan. In the real world, people have not agreed to the activities of the state. Under what conditions could people be depicted as being in agreement with institutions to which they have not actually agreed? >Solution/Buchanan: Buchanan extended the market-exchange logic - one in which all parties to an exchange voluntarily agree to it - to collective activity >Collective Action/Buchanan. 1. James M. Buchanan, “The Pure Theory of Government Finance: Suggested Approach” (1949)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Boudreaux I Donald J. Boudreaux Randall G. Holcombe The Essential James Buchanan Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 2021 Boudreaux II Donald J. Boudreaux The Essential Hayek Vancouver: Fraser Institute 2014 |
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> Counter arguments against Buchanan
> Counter arguments in relation to State (Polity)
