|Brocker I 484
Interests/Power/OlsonVsTradition/Olson: it is not the case that larger groups have more influence (power) than smaller groups. (1) These authors take it for granted "that such groups should act to defend or advance their group interests, and that individuals in these groups must also work for their personal economic interests" (2).
Brocker I 485
Solution/Olson: A common interest in a collective good is (...) not a sufficient condition for the provision of this good. Due to the structural advantages of small groups in the provision of collective goods, Olson even comes to a contrary conclusion. See Communicative Action/Olson, Collectives/Olson.
Brocker I 486
Olson thesis: The interests of small groups are overrepresented in political competition. See Politics/Olson.
1. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass. 1965. Dt.: Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns: Kollektivgüter und die Theorie der Gruppen, Tübingen 1998 (zuerst 1968)., S. 107.
2.Ebenda S. 125
Johannes Marx, „Mancur Olson, Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups Cambridge 1965
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018