|Mause I 106
Public Choice/North: this is about explaining why it can be advantageous for rulers to prevent the spread of more efficient institutions (e.g. private property rights) in the interests of securing power and maximizing their "ruling pension" (a share of state revenues). (1)
1. D. North, Structure and change in economic history. New York 1981_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
|North, Douglas C.
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018