|Mause I 156f
Prisoner's Dilemma/Commodity Allocation/Economy/Common goods/Fudenberg: rationally, each player (user of a general good) places his own interests in the foreground. (See Prisoner's Dilemma/Ostrom).
As a result, all those involved find themselves in the worst collective situation of all-round overuse - the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium.
Repetition/Fudenberg: In game theory, this does not change even if the users play their prisoner's dilemma (finally often) repeatedly: the defection of all inevitably leads to the pareto inferiority of the game result. Only in the theoretical extreme case of an infinite repetition of always the same game predicts the theoretical folk theorem (e.g. Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) (1) that mutual cooperation can also be of equal importance.
1. D. Fudenberg, E. Maskin, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54, (3) 1986, p. 533– 554._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information 1986
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018