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II 87
Truth conditions/Searle: Example x sees a yellow station wagon.
The truth terms are:
(a) certain conditions of satisfaction
(b) certain phenomenal characteristics of the experience
The conditions of performance are:
that there is a yellow station wagon and that this station wagon causes the experience.
The phenomenal characteristics:
determine the satisfaction conditions. (So the experience determines these conditions.)
II 89
Twin Earth/Particularity/satisfaction conditions/Searle: For example, what about the content of Bill's visual experience is decisive for the fact that the presence of Sally (and not of twin Sally) is one of the satisfaction conditions of his experience?
How can qualitatively identical visual experiences have different particulate satisfaction conditions?
It's not the question of how to determine that. Rather, what is decisive about the experience here on earth is that it can only be fulfilled by a special, previously identified woman. (It doesn't matter whether one can determine this or not).
II 105
Apparent paradox :
Conditions of performance/House/house façade/Searle: if the conditions of performance of the experience in the case of the house differ from those in the case of the façade and if these conditions are determined by different experiences, then gradually the impression arises as if almost every quality could be the condition of performance of a visual experience.
We not only say "it looks like a house" but also "he looks drunk" or "he looks intelligent".
II 106
The characteristics themselves seem to entail very strict conditions for what can occur as conditions for the fulfilment of visual experiences.
It is hard to believe that characteristics such as intelligence should be able to play a causal role in a visual experience.
Searle: but according to my theory it should actually be like this.
Solution: we need to distinguish between two types of properties:
a) those that are decided by looking, and
(b) those requiring further testing.
II 107
Features: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence that looking red is not independent of being red.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-02-24
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