Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Satisfaction conditions: Models or predicates can be satisfied (by objects). E.G., "green" is satisfied by grass. Satisfaction is needed to define truth. See also Truth definition, Satisfaction._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Conditions of Satisfaction - Dictionary of Arguments
II 87 Truth Conditions/Searle: example x sees a yellow station wagon. The truth terms are: (a) certain conditions of satisfaction, (b) certain phenomenal characteristics of the experience. The conditions of performance are: that there is a yellow station wagon and that this station wagon causes the experience. The phenomenal characteristics: determine the satisfaction conditions. (So the experience determines these conditions.) >Truth condition, >Experience, >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. II 89 Twin Earth/particularity/satisfaction conditions/Searle: e.g. what if the content of Bill's visual experience is decisive for the fact that the presence of Sally (and not of twin Sally) is one of the satisfaction conditions of his experience? >Twin earth. How can qualitatively identical visual experiences have different particulate satisfaction conditions? It is not the question of how to determine that. Rather, what is decisive about the experience here on earth is that it can only be fulfilled by a special, previously identified woman. (It does not matter whether one can determine this or not). II 105 Apparent paradox: Conditions of performance/house/house façade/Searle: if the conditions of performance of the experience in the case of the house differ from those in the case of the façade and if these conditions are determined by different experiences, then gradually the impression arises as if almost every quality could be the condition of performance of a visual experience. >Barn facades/Goldman, >Causal theory of Knowledge. We not only say "it looks like a house" but also "he looks drunk" or "he looks intelligent". >">Appearance. II 106 The characteristics themselves seem to entail very strict conditions for what can occur as conditions for the fulfilment of visual experiences. It is hard to believe that characteristics such as intelligence should be able to play a causal role in a visual experience. Searle: but according to my theory it should actually be like this. Solution: we need to distinguish between two types of properties: (a) those that are decided by looking, and (b) those requiring further testing. II 107 Features: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence that looking red is not independent of being red. >Properties/Searle._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Conditions of Satisfaction
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20