|Naming: Naming is the act of assigning a word or phrase to a person, place, thing, or idea. See also Proper names, Denotation, Designation, Singular terms, Descriptions, Reference, Causal theory of names.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Saul A. Kripke on Naming - Dictionary of Arguments
Designation/Kripke: designation has nothing to do with existence: wrong question: "Does ___ live on Mars?" and then insert name. ((s) The substitutional quantification: would be satisfied by name, because it refuses an ontology that goes beyond its expressions.)
Kripke I 121
Designation does not create identity: Phosphorus/Hesperus has the same epistemic situation named as different celestial bodies - it is quite possible, therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds.
>Identity/Kripke, >Morning star/evening star, >Possible world/Kripke.
Geach: designation reflects something important: Nixon = human (a priori). KripkeVs: e.g. Lot’s guests are Angles despite designation. Difference: there is a difference in the use of the name/designation. This is no case of indeterminacy of reference.
>Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability of reference, >Reference/Kripke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984