Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Picture, mapping: what conditions must meet a picture? In how it relates to the depicted object? Is there a copy ratio in nature? See also similarity, causation, representation, causality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Wilfrid Sellars on Picture (Mapping) - Dictionary of Arguments
II 314 Representation/Sellars: to say of a particular atomic fact it would be represented by a certain elementary statement, we must use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1)S(in L) maps aRb. This mapping relationship cannot be expressed by a statement. Wittgenstein ditto. But not A and B are mapped, but a fact about a and b. Therefore, (1) has the form: (1""")S(in L) maps the fact that aRb. This now presupposes that the fact aRb in a sense, is an object. But then it is an object of a special kind, because: object: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of a statement can be made). II 315 ... Thus, the problem of truth is only postponed. Because if facts belong to language (language/world) then "mapping" is a relation between statement and statement (Linguistic Idealism). Then the world must belong to language that would be absurd. >Truth functions, >World/thinking, >Representation, >Presentation, >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge, >Facts, >Statements, >Observation sentence, >Mapping, >Knowledge representation. II 316 Solution: S(in L) means aRb and that aRb is a fact then we can apply our conception of "Picture" to the distinction that we have obtained from the semantic theory. (>disquotation/Tarski). It is well known that Wittgenstein restricted his picture theory to fact statements in the narrower sense. II 317 Thesis: that elementary statements are configurations of proper names that map configurations of objects. This means that statements are not lists of words. II 333 If concluding is an activity, then mapping is no relation. (II 312 > description). And there are those uniformities, by virtue of which a picture is an actual relation between objects in nature._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Sellars
> Counter arguments in relation to Picture (Mapping)
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19