|Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Abstract/McGinn: why should not something that is essentially independent of consciousness (numbers) possibly have a profound nature that is inaccessible to our thinking?
Why should the abstract not be able to have a noumenal side?
Certainly, our attempts to define the category of the abstract are miserable, e.g. if we declare that it is not spatial or causal.
It looks like the Abstract World pushes into the very nature of our mind in a way incomprehensible to us.
McGinn: We would do better to settle the corresponding objects within our mind. Then we would not have to deal with any "barriers" on top of everything. (Of course this does not solve the underlying problem)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001