Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Abstract: non-representational - abstract concept, expression of something non-objective - how to demarcate from concrete objects? How to differentiate between abstract entities and concepts, ultimately words._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Abstractness - Dictionary of Arguments
I 102 Abstract/Concrete/Quine: abstract and concrete are independent from stimulus meaning. I 212 ff Abstract terms: abstract terms are alleged names of properties. "Roundness": "F"/"round":"a" in "Fa" - should not be used unhesitatingly without metaphysical definition because this would be too non-binding. Every abstract singular term provides an abstract general term. I 219 Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometrical figures, ideas, possibilities - some of these categories can be abandoned or reduced. - One can faithfully distinguish them from concrete ones by use of "-ness". I 238 Plural: the plural is an abstract singular term: "lions are dying out". The disposition is "eats mice" (31). I 286 Intensional abstraction: intensional abstraction is "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". I 289 Class abstraction is attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) instead of: x^(..x..). This is not possible for intensional abstraction. Difference classes/Properties: classes with the same elements are identical. Properties are not quite identical if they are attributed to the same things. I 361f Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties are opaque (>Planets-example/Quine). I 295 Class abstraction is transparent, whereas intensional abstraction is opaque. V 167 Abstract general term: is a relative clause: "Y is a class X such that FX". New is that these are classes of classes. A normal relative clause equals a general term: "y is a thing x such that Fx". VII (d) 75 Concrete/abstract/Quine: by pointing to a square we do not assume identity with others. "Squareness" is shared by other objects, but we do not need to insinuate entities like "attributes". We do not point to the "attributes" (as an entity) nor do we need it in reference to the word "square". VII (d) 77 Abstract Singular Term/Quine: the abstract singular term functions like names. Philosophically revolutionary is setting abstract entities (unlike general term). VII (f) 113 Abstract Entities/Quine: classes and truth values may be accepted as abstract entities. Only statements and predicates should not be regarded as names of these and other entities, i.e. "p", "q"p,"F" etc. These should not be bindable (quantifiable) variables (>2nd order logic) - (E.g.)(x is a dog. x is white.) does not commit X to "dogness" or to the class of white things as universals. The solution is using the explicit form: belonging to two classes: (Ex)(xεy.xεz). Of course, there are names for abstract entities like the singular term "dogness", "class of white things" (as names ((s) it does not imply existence))._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |