Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Actual: in relation to the real world as opposed to a merely possible world or situation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
Robert Stalnaker on Actuality - Dictionary of Arguments
I 28 Actuality/Stalnaker: actuality is a relation that a world has to itself and only to itself. Problem: any other world can also have it to itself. That means actuality is contingent. >Contingency, >Self-identity. LewisVsErsatz World: (moderate modal realism): an ersatz world represents the real world as a special one because it represents it as a "way". >ersatz world. StalnakerVsLewis: but it represents it specifically only from its own point of view, not from any. Stalnaker: there is no neutral position outside of each possible world but there is an objective one: the one from the real world. >Actual world, >Perspective. I 31 The thesis that only the real world is actual only makes sense when "actual" means something different than the totality of all that, that is there. >Totality, >Wholes. StalnakerVs: and it does not mean that. I 31 Way a world can be: is an abstract object, abstracted from the activity of the rationally acting. Cf. >Centered worlds._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |