Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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General Term: a word that does not single out individuals, but sets of objects which are determined by characteristics - contrast singular term. There are problems in relation to universals and reference.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 102
Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. A name or general term for space-time segments: has the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness").
I 212
Difference verb/noun/adjective: is less important but the difference between singular term/general term is very important.
>Singular Terms/Quine.
I 212
Abstract terms: are alleged names of properties, e.g. "roundness": "F"/"round": "a" in "Fa" - should not be used carelessly without metaphysical determination. It is thereby unbinding. Each abstract singular term provides an abstract general term.
V 102
General term/Quine: E.g. has one more degree of freedom: can be different dogs - Fido: has only one degree of freedom. - ((s) temporal).
>Freedom/Quine.
V 123
General term/Quine: is e.g. animal, dog, body, built-in individuation. - General term: is true - singular term: is a denominator function of a particular. Problem: are learned as observation sentences. They bear no reference on objects but return of mom is the return of a circumstance. Therefore reference by a general term because of individuation: singular term does not individuate. Wrong: This is a Fido.
V 125
Individuation/general term/Quine: square is an individuating word - "(s) Fido, not: E.g. This is a Fido.
V 125
a) General term: E.g. "Square" in -This is a square- and E.g. -This is the same square as that one- b) singular term: E.g. "The square is a form". ((s) here, form is the general term; predication must always combine a singular term and a general term) - they are language-bound: E.g. Red is a color (general term). - Object-bound: E.g. -The square is a form: just like E.g. Fido is a dog (singular term).
V 126
Singular term/general term/Platonism/universalia/language acquisition/Quine: E.g. A dog is an animal - problem: different dogs are different animals - on the other hand, the square is a form that says something about a single form, just like - "E.g. Fido is a dog". (s) Otherwise you would need two universals: dogness and animality - platonistic/Quine: The dog is numerous.
VII (d) 70
General term/Quine: "Red" and "River" are similar - but places are only conceptually connected with color, not like the parts of the river - this is not a question of abstractness. It is not a "name" of any separated entity (as "attribute", "squareness"). A general term in everyday language is often like a name - with "square" much like a singular term (because of pointing) - with "red" there is no difference to a singular term.
General term: 1) showing does not assume identity from occasion to occasion (unlike the case with the singular term) - 2) The general term is not a name of any separated entity.
VII (d) 77
General Term/Quine: is indispensable - it probably originated from reaction similarity - to understand it one needs the operator "class of" or "-ness". - Missing these operators was the reason to assume "abstract entities".
>Abstractness/Quine.
VII (f) 107f
General term: E.g. "is a whale" or "can swim": may be regarded as names of classes - predicates: if they denote classes, they can be considered in a way that they have properties as their meaning. (>Church).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-09-28
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