Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| General Term: a word that does not single out individuals, but sets of objects which are determined by characteristics - contrast singular term. There are problems in relation to universals and reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on General Terms - Dictionary of Arguments
I 102 Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. A name or general term for space-time segments: has the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). I 212 Difference verb/noun/adjective: is less important but the difference between singular term/general term is very important. >Singular Terms/Quine. I 212 Abstract terms: are alleged names of properties, e.g. "roundness": "F"/"round": "a" in "Fa" - should not be used carelessly without metaphysical determination. It is thereby unbinding. Each abstract singular term provides an abstract general term. V 102 General term/Quine: E.g. has one more degree of freedom: can be different dogs - Fido: has only one degree of freedom. - ((s) temporal). >Freedom/Quine. V 123 General term/Quine: is e.g. animal, dog, body, built-in individuation. - General term: is true - singular term: is a denominator function of a particular. Problem: are learned as observation sentences. They bear no reference on objects but return of mom is the return of a circumstance. Therefore reference by a general term because of individuation: singular term does not individuate. Wrong: This is a Fido. V 125 Individuation/general term/Quine: square is an individuating word - "(s) Fido, not: E.g. This is a Fido. V 125 a) General term: E.g. "Square" in -This is a square- and E.g. -This is the same square as that one- b) singular term: E.g. "The square is a form". ((s) here, form is the general term; predication must always combine a singular term and a general term) - they are language-bound: E.g. Red is a color (general term). - Object-bound: E.g. -The square is a form: just like E.g. Fido is a dog (singular term). V 126 Singular term/general term/Platonism/universalia/language acquisition/Quine: E.g. A dog is an animal - problem: different dogs are different animals - on the other hand, the square is a form that says something about a single form, just like - "E.g. Fido is a dog". (s) Otherwise you would need two universals: dogness and animality - platonistic/Quine: The dog is numerous. VII (d) 70 General term/Quine: "Red" and "River" are similar - but places are only conceptually connected with color, not like the parts of the river - this is not a question of abstractness. It is not a "name" of any separated entity (as "attribute", "squareness"). A general term in everyday language is often like a name - with "square" much like a singular term (because of pointing) - with "red" there is no difference to a singular term. General term: 1) showing does not assume identity from occasion to occasion (unlike the case with the singular term) - 2) The general term is not a name of any separated entity. VII (d) 77 General Term/Quine: is indispensable - it probably originated from reaction similarity - to understand it one needs the operator "class of" or "-ness". - Missing these operators was the reason to assume "abstract entities". >Abstractness/Quine. VII (f) 107f General term: E.g. "is a whale" or "can swim": may be regarded as names of classes - predicates: if they denote classes, they can be considered in a way that they have properties as their meaning. (>Church)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to General Terms
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20