Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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A priori: something that we can know without prior (empirical) investigation. Is the inventory of a priori certainties purely logical? Is a priori knowledge always necessary?

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Saul A. Kripke on A priori - Dictionary of Arguments

I 46
Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: Goldbach's conjecture will turn out to be true or false but then by necessity.
I 75f
A priori/not necessary: e.g. determining the reference of the term "one meter"/stadard meter: it is possible to know a priori that the length of this stick is one meter, and this would not be seen as a necessary truth.
I 127
Difference: a priori/necessary: Kripke: one could empirically discover the essence (e.g. water = H20).
>Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity de re, >standard meter, >Necessity a posteriori.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-03-25
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