Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Roderick Chisholm on Attributive/referential - Dictionary of Arguments
I 89 Attributive Meaning/Chisholm: the property of being-F is the attributive meaning of the expression T in a language L if it is true for every object that 1) it is only designated with it if it has that property, 2) every speaker then assumes the property. I 90 Name: Important Argument: not valid for names. >Proper names, >Reference, >Meaning. I 108 Annemary has no attributive meaning, therefore there is no property of "loving Annemary." >Ontology/Chisholm. - - - II 112 Referential/Attributive/Brandl: based on reports: only attributive - in addition, there are still the cases of "whoever it is" - according to this, both, ref and att, are based on a de-re belief - i.e. we cannot say that att only covers one area that is only possible with de-dicto use. II 112 Attributive/Brandl: works only with de dicto-use, not if the speaker knows the object - whoever it is: "area" does not work: neither seen object nor from report - distinction ref/att is to be made within de-re statements - but we must always know what role the reference plays in the concrete case. II 120 Referential/Donnellan/Brandl: here, the speaker must not only know what the object designated by him is, but he must also know it - only then belief de-re "of the smallest spy" possible. II 123 Contradiction to the above: only ref. if the speaker can take from reports of others who it is about. II 126 Referential is the basic form of every reference - BrandlVs: this is the reductionist variant. II 125 Attributive/Brandl: here, the "directedness" of the description function depends on the expressions - (borderline case) - with that, the speaker refers to an object, because he knows that he is also the only one to fulfill another description - ( "epistemically close": "epistemic familiarity": even without acquaintance, by source of information - then knowledge possible that it is one and the same, from acquaintance and from description.) >Description. II Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Attributive/referential
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19