Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Statement: once a statement is made the utterer is committed to it. In contrast to this, a sentence can be thought of as a string of symbols that is no statement.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Peter F. Strawson on Statements - Dictionary of Arguments

Meggle I 300
According to Hungerland
Presupposition/Strawson: Definition "S requires S": The truth of S is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the claim that S.
E.g. "All my children are fast asleep" presupposes "I have children."
David RyninVsStrawson: from this interpretation follows, paradoxically, that all prerequisite statements were true: it should be: S>S" and ~ S>S"; but it is also true that Sv~S. It follows: S".
In other words: (~ S"> ~ (Sv ~ S))> S is analytically true in a system of divalent propositional logic.
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Horwich I 186
Statement/Strawson: ambiguous: a) Saying, speech act - b) the said, the content what is true or false - the plot is not w/f - AustinVsStrawson: s are the speech acts themselves which are w/f - or truth is attributed to speech acts.(1)

1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
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Strawson I 193
Statement/Strawson: more comprehensive than assertion.
I 205
Statement/Strawson: the binding part of the sentence is the sign of saying "Socrates is ..." - if this "is" is seen as autonomous, then no difference between A and B anymore.
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II 246/47
Statement/Strawson: double meaning: a) what I say, b) my saying- truth, regardless of whether the utterance was made - StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: truth is not to be attributed to the event.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-07-29
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