Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Statement: once a statement is made the utterer is committed to it. In contrast to this, a sentence can be thought of as a string of symbols that is no statement. See also Assertions, Sentences, Utterances, Judgments._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter F. Strawson on Statements - Dictionary of Arguments
Meggle I 300 According to Hungerland Presupposition/Strawson: Definition "S requires S": The truth of S is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of the claim that S. E.g. "All my children are fast asleep" presupposes "I have children." David RyninVsStrawson: from this interpretation follows, paradoxically, that all prerequisite statements were true: it should be: S>S" and ~ S>S"; but it is also true that Sv~S. It follows: S". In other words: (~ S"> ~ (Sv ~ S))> S is analytically true in a system of divalent propositional logic. --- Horwich I 186 Statement/Strawson: ambiguous: a) Saying, speech act b) the said, the content what is true or false - the plot is not true or false. AustinVsStrawson: s are the speech acts themselves which are w/f - or truth is attributed to speech acts.(1) >Speech acts. 1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Strawson I 193 Statement/Strawson: more comprehensive than assertion. I 205 Statement/Strawson: the binding part of the sentence is the sign of saying "Socrates is ..." If this "is" is seen as autonomous, then no difference between A and B anymore. >"Is", >Copula, >Identity. II 246/47 Statement/Strawson: double meaning: a) what I say, b) my saying. It is about truth, regardless of whether the utterance was made. >Utterance/Strawson. StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: truth is not to be attributed to the event._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Statements
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19