Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
I 18 Sense: according to Frege, the term has the meaning simply. The user need not always have the sense before his mind. In itself the meaning is objective. I 29 Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes use of the concept of truth superfluous > Meaning before Truth. I 45 f .... Husserl: a statement adopts the meaning with which it is met by an internal act . ((s)> Humpty- Dumpty Theory of Meaning). Def Meaning/Dummett: what one must know in order to understand the term (an expression). I 152 Def meaning: what makes a sentence true. I 154/55 Dummett : meaning must not be explained by understanding. ( Speakers have no explicit theory.) - but also: DummettVsWittgenstein: mastery over practical ability. I 188 Dummett/Frege: Knowledge of Meaning = knowledge of the truth conditions - WittgensteinVs A criterion of meaning has no basis when it is no theory of meaning as a proposition. - - - II 109 Meaning/DummettVsDavidson: trivial axioms ( . " Snow..." / snow) does not even show understanding, but push the task of explaining the theory of meaning - it explains what it means to capture the corresponding proposition. II 133 Meaning/Dummett: remains an unsolved problem. - - - I 29 Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth - Davidson truth before meaning (Defined truth conditions - later the theory) - Dummett both together. Use/truth /Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. > Meaning before Truth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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