Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J. Fodor on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
Cresswell II 56 Meanings/Fodor/Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: thesis: meanings are in the head. >Putnam: "meanings ain't in the head", >Twin earth. CresswellVsFodor: problem with the ascription, I will have to have the same representation in the head. It must have the same belief as the one he has (meanings are not representations). >Representations, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. --- IV 57 Meaning/Quine: meaning does not arise from speaker meaning, no acceptance of inferences of the speaker. The speaker meaning depends on the worldview, and thus of an intention what the words should mean. It cannot distinguish between the views the speaker accepted a priori and those he accepted later. So there are no analytic sentences, there is no epistemic criteria for “true by meaning”. >Speaker meaning, >Analyticity/syntheticity. IV 117 Meaning/truth/Davidson: a speaker holds a sentence to be true because of the meaning and because of his/her belief. So we cannot conclude from utterance meaning if we do not know the beliefs of the speaker and we cannot do it the other way around. IV 121 Belief ascription/attribution of meaning/Davidson's theory: information about the shape of the words which are held to be true are the decisive evidence for both attributions here. The adoption of sincerity alone is not enough to detect meaning. We need information either about his/her belief or about the meanings. Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: then the primacy thesis is implausible (primacy thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions for belief ascription"). >Attribution, >Belief ascription._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16