Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nelson Goodman on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 52 Ways of meaning are: 1. denotation, 2. exemplification, 3. expression and 4. "mediated reference". >Denotation, >Exemplification, >Expression, >Reference. IV 142ff Sameness of meaning seems to include more than co-extensitivity of expressions. But we have not found intuitive adequate standards for synonymy since the internal lexicon supposedly contains the meanings of our expressions, the ambiguity surrounding the term of meaning leads to a lack of clarity about what the lexicon finally is to contain. IV 143 Often nothing in the consciousness of the speaker determines the extension of his expressions. E.g. I can know that "Feynman" and "Gell-Man" are the names of important physicist, but might not know how the one differs from the other. >Extension, >Speaker meeaning. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18